Miért voltak a Brit és Francia gyárak kisebbek mint a német gyárak, és miért használtak elmaradott technológiákat a németekhez képest az I.VH. előtt?

" nemzetközi szinten a francia frank jelentősége is megelőzte a német márkáét."

Szétröhögöm a fejem. A Francia gazdaság kb. fele volt a németnek. Ha az európai kereskedelmet nézzük, a franciák számára egyre gyorsabban, kétségbeejtő mértékben szűkülő piacokkal.

"Hanem a mezőgazdaságot, a kereskedelmet, a pénzügyi és a szolgáltató szektort kell alatta érteni."

Konrétan csak az iparról beszélt abban a mondatban a lexikon.

"Hanem a mezőgazdaságot, a kereskedelmet, a pénzügyi és a szolgáltató szektort kell alatta érteni."

Csakhogy ezek EGYIKE SEM IPAR!!!!!

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Image result for pre-industrial sectors

Pre-industrial refers to a time before there were machines and tools to help perform tasks en masse. Pre-industrial civilization dates back to centuries ago, but the main era known as the pre-industrial society occurred right before the industrial society.

Tehát az ipari forradalom előtti szektorokat említették.

Kicsit sem zavar hogy ha összeadod Európában a cigányó Latinó Monetáris Unió országainak gazdasági teljesítményét, még mindig kisebbek mint a német gazdaság?

‘Industry and Empire’ by Eric Hobsbawm, and Norbert Wiener’s thought provoking ‘English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit’. Some key points:

The industrial revolution in England took place in complete isolation from the universities, and relied on ‘common sense’ and ingenuity rather than any kind of academic science. German industrialisation came later, but had sounder scientific roots and so was arguably more secure: it was as early as 1871 that German coal and steel production overtook that of the UK, and some people date British decline to that year.

The foundation of what later became Imperial College (by Prince Albert, and with considerable assistance from Germany); of the Storey Institute (the origin of Lancaster University) and what later became Manchester University represented a determined but inadequate response to this situation. Britain never really developed the kind of institutes of teaching and research in applied sciences with close links to industrial users of their work that characterise the German landscape. This partly explains German dominance of sectors such as the Chemical industry that depend crucially upon insights from applied science.

Britain never really developed world-class industrial companies in the new science-based industries that dominated the economy over the 1880–1950 period. British companies enjoyed a protected market thanks to the British empire, and so never learned from competitive pressures to reach global standards of quality and cost control.

Skill shortages have been a constant problem for the UK’s science-based industries. Part of the problem has been the decline and virtual elimination of the traditional apprenticeship route (and even before these opportunities begain to vanish in the 1970s, apprentices did not learn sufficient science for the demands of their changing roles while talented young people were steered towards university rather than following this route). In Germany, meanwhile, there has always been a formidably effective system to provide post-school training and education in the ‘useful arts’. While the British university sector expanded enormously in the early 1960s and again in the late 1990s, it did not produce graduates with the combination of scientific knowledge and practical skills that a good apprenticeship confers. An additional problem was that graduates in subjects such as Engineering found that the financial sector (among others) offered far better career prospects than traditional roles in manufacturing industry. Businesses were constantly crying out for engineers but did not use them effectively and certainly did not pay them properly.

An additional factor has been Britain’s bloated “defence” sector in the period since 1950. Graduates and others with technical skills tended to be drawn to the companies that relied on defence contracts rather than selling to a mass market. Since the process of winning a government contract for a new missile system is very different from the marketing required to sell (say) a large number of smartphones, these companies are unable to move into different areas of business and so do nothing for general economic development.

Finally, the owners of industry have behaved very differently in Britain and in Germany. It is a cliche that the City of London (that is, the stock market) is interested only in the short term, so that capital is directed towards companies that provide dividends and short-term share price rises rather than those that invest in training and new product development. In Germany a considerable proportion of corporate share capital is held by institutions that see themselves as long-term partners of the businesses that they partly own, and so management have greater leeway to sacrifice short-term returns for longer-term development.